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Introduction 
One hundred and fifty years after President Abraham Lincoln signed the Emancipation 
Proclamation, the debate regarding the president’s constitutional authority to issue the 
Proclamation is no less interesting than it was when the proclamation was issued.  The 13th 
Amendment substantially mooted the need to determine the proclamation’s constitutionality.  
However, thorny questions regarding the limits of President Lincoln’s executive authority 
remain.  Usually, the focus of the debate regarding the Emancipation Proclamation centers on 
President Lincoln’s commander-in-chief power.  However, when viewed relatively expansively, 
the commander-in-chief power can be more like a trump card or conversation ender.  The 
arguably more interesting question is whether President Lincoln had the constitutional authority 
to issue the Emancipation Proclamation in the absence of commander-in-chief authority.  Given 
the legislation that Congress passed before the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, President 
Lincoln may well have had the constitutional authority to issue a substantial portion of the 
Emancipation Proclamation under his general executive authority to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.   
Between the advent of the Civil War and the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, 
Congress passed several laws that addressed slavery.  In each one, Congress moved toward 
freeing more slaves and limiting slavery in general.  Congress also indicated a willingness to 
emancipate slaves as war policy.  Indeed, those laws also gave the president the power and duty 
to seize the property of those who were engaged in war against the United States or were 
disloyal.  President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation against that legislative 
backdrop.  The brief essay raises and discusses issues surrounding whether President Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation that freed all slaves held in areas designated by the president to be 
under rebellion on January 1, 1863, was an exercise of his “take care” executive authority. The 
answer depends, of course, on the nature of executive authority.  The brief essay begins with a 
discussion of the legislation the preceded the Emancipation Proclamation, continues with a 
discussion of the Emancipation Proclamation and ends with a discussion of the nature of 
executive authority.     
 
I. Pre-Emancipation Proclamation Civil War Legislation  
  
A. The First Confiscation Act 
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Passed soon after the First Battle of Bull Run, the First Confiscation Act (12 Stat. 319) was 
signed by President Lincoln on August 6, 1861.  Titled “An Act to confiscate Property used for 
Insurrectionary purposes,” the Act provided that property, including slaves, used to support “the 
present or any future insurrection against the Government of the United States” would be “lawful 
subject of prize and capture.”  The purpose of the First Confiscation Act was to slow the direct 
use of property against the United States.  For example, rebel forces were being augmented by 
the use of slave labor, as slaves had been used to do jobs that Confederate soldiers might 
otherwise do.  That increased the functional capacity of the confederate forces fighting the Union 
forces.  The Act passed both as a way to stop the property from being used against the United 
States and as a reminder that the United States planned to respond to the rebellion seriously. 
Under the Act, the property owner lost his rights in the property not necessarily as a punishment, 
but because the property had been used improperly against the United States.  Given that the 
action was in the nature of forfeiture, the property rights in the property were to be transferred to 
the United States.  The property had not merely been commandeered. The previous owner could 
not reclaim the property even at the war’s end.  The Act stated that seized property would be 
condemned in a proper federal district court and sold for the benefit of the United States.  The 
Act provided the President with both the right and the obligation “to cause the [subject property] 
to be seized, confiscated, and condemned.” 
The Act did not explicitly distinguish between human and non-human property.  However, it 
appeared to treat the different types of property somewhat differently.  Non-human property was 
clearly to be sold for the benefit to the United States.  No explicit provision was made for human 
property.  The Act simply indicated that the owner of a slave lost his rights in the slaves and that 
the slave would be free of the obligation of labor to the previous owner.  The First Confiscation 
Act did not clarify that slaves seized as a result of the Act were to be emancipated.  However, it 
also did not suggest that those slaves would be treated as U.S. property, held and possibly sold at 
some later date.  Later congressional enactments and the war itself clarified the issue. 
B. The Second Confiscation Act 
The Second Confiscation Act (12 Stat. 589) was more complex than the First Confiscation Act.  
Signed on July 17, 1862, the Act was titled “An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason 
and Rebellion, to seize and confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for other Purposes.”  Unlike 
the First Confiscation Act, which focused on property used to support the war effort directly, the 
Second Confiscation Act was meant to target the property of people who were making war 
against the United States.  The Act had two separate aims.  The first was the confiscation of 
property.  The second was the emancipation of slaves who were subject to confiscation.  
The Act explicitly reached the property of people who were convicted of treason and those who 
were convicted of being involved in the rebellion, including those who had given aid or comfort 
to the rebellion. The punishment for the criminal offense was, in part, the seizure of the 
defendant’s property and the liberation of the defendant’s slaves.  The slaves need not have 
directly supported the confederate war effort.  Rather, they merely needed to be the property of 
people who had supported the war effort and been convicted of the crime.   
The Act also identified specified groups of people who were to have their property seized.  
Groups included officers of the army or navy of the Confederacy, high-level officers in the 
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Confederate government and lower-level officers in Confederate state governments. In addition, 
the act covered “any person who, owning property in any loyal State or Territory of the United 
States, or in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter assist and give aid and comfort to such 
rebellion.”  The president was charged with seizing subject property and using the proceeds from 
that property to support the army.  After naming the groups covered, the Act provided President 
Lincoln the power to designate an additional group of people whose property would be subject to 
forfeiture.   
The Act authorized the president to warn “any person within any State or Territory of the United 
States . . . being engaged in armed rebellion against the government of the United States, or 
aiding or abetting such rebellion” to stop supporting the rebellion and return their allegiance to 
the United States.  If they did not do so within sixty days of the warning, their property would be 
subject to seizure.  Indeed, the President was obligated to seize the subject property and use 
proceeds from the seizure.  The Act provided a mechanism to speed condemnation proceedings 
against all of the non-human property the president was duty-bound to seize, so that it could be 
sold and its proceeds used for the United States.   This mechanism was easier for the government 
to use than the mechanism provided in the First Confiscation Act, though forfeiture through 
courts was not used particularly broadly pursuant to either Confiscation Act.  
A significant textual difference between the First Confiscation Act and the Second Confiscation 
Act is that the Second Confiscation Act explicitly provided for the emancipation of slaves. This 
is not an idle point.  The confiscation portion of the Second Confiscation Act and the forfeiture 
portion of the Second Confiscation Act had been separate bills for much of the legislative 
process.  Congressmen understood that there was a difference between taking property rights in 
slaves from rebels either to stop them from using their property against the government or as 
punishment for making war on the United States, and freeing those slaves.  Indeed, there had 
been congressional debate about the distinction.  However, by the time the Second Confiscation 
Act passed, the forfeiture and the emancipation sections had been joined.     
The substance of the emancipation portion of the Act is significant. The Act freed any slave who 
escaped into Union lines, was captured from his master, or was found in a place that had been 
occupied by rebel forces, if the slave’s master had engaged in rebellion or had “in any way 
[given] aid or comfort” to the rebellion.  The Act stated that those slaves “shall be deemed 
captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude, and not again held as slaves.”  The 
Act noted that a fugitive slave could be returned to his owner, if the person claiming the fugitive 
swore an oath that the slave’s owner “[had] not borne arms against the United States in the 
present rebellion, nor in any way given aid and comfort thereto.”  However, members of the 
armed forces could not be party to surrendering fugitive slaves or returning fugitive slaves to 
their owners.  Lastly, the president was authorized to use African manpower “as he may deem 
necessary and proper for the suppression of this rebellion,” freeing the president to use seized, 
freed and escaped slaves in the military.  
C. Additional Laws 
 
Congress passed additional acts, before the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, that suggest 
that Congress was tilting toward emancipation. Congress prohibited military officials from 
returning fugitive slaves to their masters, with President Lincoln signing the law on March 13, 
1862.  Congress abolished slavery in the District of Columbia, with President Lincoln signing the 
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law on April 16, 1862.  Congress abolished slavery in the territories, with President Lincoln 
signing the law on June 19, 1862.  Congress passed the Militia Act of 1862, with President 
Lincoln signing the law on July 17, 1862, the same day he signed the Second Confiscation Act.  
Further, it granted freedom to any former slave who rendered military service under the Militia 
Act if that slave had been owned by someone who had levied war on the U.S. or had given aid or 
comfort to enemies of the U.S. during the rebellion.  In addition, the former slave’s mother, wife 
and children, would be free based on the former slave’s military service if the mother, wife and 
children had been owned by someone who had levied war or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
of the United States.  These laws suggest that Congress was willing to emancipate slaves 
wherever it thought reasonable and wherever it thought it had the authority to do so.  When 
added to the First and Second Confiscation Acts, President Lincoln had been provided significant 
latitude to affect slavery directly.   
 
D. Implications  
With the laws Congress passed before the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, Congress 
gave President Lincoln significant authority to seize property, liberate slaves as a result, and to 
use black Americans militarily whenever appropriate to help suppress the rebellion.  President 
Lincoln was specifically given the authority and duty to confiscate and condemn property used 
directly against the United States in support of the rebellion.  President Lincoln was specifically 
given the authority and duty to seize the property of certain groups of people inside of the 
Confederate states and inside of loyal states who were supporting or giving aid to the rebellion.  
President Lincoln was given the authority to issue a proclamation giving notice to people in 
Confederate states that the president could seize the property of people in those states who 
continued to aid or abet the rebellion.   
All property, including slaves, of the affected persons was subject to forfeiture.  Those owners 
lost all rights to the property.  Though the First Confiscation Act did not foreclose the possibility 
that property rights in human property – slaves – could have been transferred to the United 
States, with the government owning the labor of slaves and with the proceeds of the sale of 
slaves being used to fight the war, congressional action demonstrated no interest in having the 
United States own slaves and no interest in preserving slavery, though slavery was still legal in 
the slave states that remained part of the Union.   
Lastly, President Lincoln was authorized to use people of African descent in the armed forces as 
he saw fit.  President Lincoln could use now-former slaves to supplement the manpower 
necessary to fight the war and presumably could encourage former slaves to become a part of the 
armed forces to help suppress the rebellion.  This was a significant step, as some did not want to 
see African Americans explicitly become part of the armed forces either because they did not 
want to make the war about slavery or because they believed that the psychological effect that 
black soldiers might have on the south would guarantee a prolonged or more savage rebellion.   
 
II. The Emancipation Proclamation  
When commentators discuss the Emancipation Proclamation, they tend to refer only to the 
proclamation issued on January 1, 1863.  However, the preliminary proclamation, issued on 
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September 22, 1862, provides context for the final proclamation.  Indeed, the final proclamation 
was arguably just a reconfirmation, in slightly different language, of the preliminary 
proclamation.  The preliminary and final Emancipation Proclamations should be discussed 
together.  
A. The Preliminary Proclamation 
The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation began with a statement of purpose declaring that 
President Lincoln, as President and Commander-in-Chief planned to restore the Union.  The 
proclamation was issued to that end, with the proposition that the rebellious states ought to rejoin 
the Union and accept gradual emancipation and colonization of slaves.  Barring reconciliation, 
“all persons held as slaves within any state, or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall 
then be in rebellion against the United States shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free[.]”  
The president would, on January 1, 1863, indicate the areas of the United States to which the 
proclamation would apply.  The government, including the military, would recognize the 
freedom of slaves and do nothing to impede the exercise of their freedom.  The proclamation 
concluded with a pledge from President Lincoln that he would recommend that, after the 
restoration of the Union, loyalists be “compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, 
including the loss of slaves.”  
The proclamation provided statutory authority for its issuance.  The proclamation noted the law, 
passed March 13, 1862, prohibiting the military from returning fugitive slaves to their owners.  It 
also noted section 9 of the Second Confiscation Act, which freed slaves of persons engaged in 
rebellion or who had given aid or comfort, whenever those slaves came under the U.S. Army’s 
control.  Finally, it noted section 10 of the Second Confiscation Act which barred the return of 
fugitive slaves unless the person seeking the fugitive slave swore oath that the owner of the slave 
had not participated in rebellion or given aid or comfort to the rebellion and which reiterated that 
the military would not participate in the return of fugitive slaves.   
B. The Final Proclamation 
The final Emancipation Proclamation was issued on January 1, 1863.  It quoted from the 
preliminary proclamation, essentially noting that the final proclamation merely sealed the 
preliminary proclamation.  President Lincoln indicated that his authority to issue the final 
Emancipation Proclamation emanated from his commander-in-chief power and that the 
proclamation was “a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing the rebellion.”  The President 
named the areas in the United States that were deemed to remain in rebellion.  He then stated:  “I 
do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of 
States, are, and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive government of the United 
States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the 
freedom of said persons.”  The proclamation then noted that the then-former slaves could join the 
United States armed forces.  
 
III. Executive Authority and the Emancipation Proclamation 
For the purposes of this essay, all legislation passed by Congress before the Proclamation’s 
promulgation is assumed to be constitutional.  That is the only reasonable way to consider 
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whether President Lincoln’s constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed” authorized him to sign and issue the Emancipation Proclamation. If some of the 
legislation enacted before the Emancipation Proclamation was issued was unconstitutional, the 
analysis becomes much too complicated for this brief essay.      
Arguably, the Emancipation Proclamation did little more than push the emancipation train down 
the tracks apace.  If emancipation was clearly coming and had been set in motion by prior 
congressional action, the Emancipation Proclamation could be thought to be a mere continuation 
of congressional policy that was likely within the president’s executive authority precisely 
because it was not bold.  Conversely, the Emancipation Proclamation arguably was a bold step 
toward freedom.  However, if the Emancipation Proclamation was a break with or radical 
departure from congressional action, it is less likely to within the president’s executive authority.  
Paradoxically, the Emancipation Proclamation’s value as proof of President Lincoln’s greatness 
may be inversely proportional to its apparent constitutionality.   
In the Emancipation Proclamation, President Lincoln identified the areas in the United States not 
under the Union’s effective political or military control, deemed them to be in rebellion, and 
declared that all slaves living in those areas were free.  The Emancipation Proclamation could be 
thought to be a declaration that every slaveholder in the areas under rebellion should be 
considered to be aiding and abetting the rebellion.  That would subject all of their property, 
including their slaves, to forfeiture.  However, the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation’s 
suggestion that loyalists living in areas controlled by rebel forces might have claims after the war 
for compensation for destroyed property, it is unlikely that the final Emancipation should be 
deemed to treat everyone in such areas as collaborators with the Confederacy.  Rather than being 
deemed a blanket condemnation of the motives and actions of all persons living in areas in 
rebellion, the Emancipation Proclamation ought to be seen as a confiscation of the property of all 
subjects – loyal and disloyal – living in areas in rebellion. Viewed in this way, the Emancipation 
Proclamation may be problematic because it fails to distinguish between the loyal and disloyal in 
a way that the Confiscation Acts and other laws passed before the Emancipation Proclamation 
was issued do.   
In practice, the Emancipation Proclamation is not a single proclamation. It is three Emancipation 
Proclamations, as it applies differently to three groups of slaves. The first group of slaves 
consists of slaves held by disloyal masters.  The second group consists of slaves who escape or 
somehow end up behind Union lines during the war, but are held by loyal masters.  The third 
group consists of slaves held by loyal masters who do not escape through Union lines during the 
war.  Each group arguably was treated differently under the laws in place when the Emancipation 
Proclamation was issued.   The proclamation’s emancipation of some slaves is on very solid 
constitutional ground.  Its emancipation of other slaves may be on dubious constitutional ground, 
at least when the president’s take care authority is taken as the only constitutional support for the 
president’s executive authority to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.  
The slaves who were held by disloyal masters arguably were free as soon as President Lincoln 
issued the final Emancipation Proclamation.  Under the Second Confiscation Act, the property of 
rebels was subject to seizure and forfeiture after the president issued a proclamation warning 
persons in areas under rebellion to stop supporting the rebellion and declare allegiance to the 
United States.  The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation served as notice to persons living in 
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areas under rebellion.  Rebel property became subject to seizure when the final Emancipation 
Proclamation was issued.   
The Second Confiscation Act placed a duty on President Lincoln to seize property subject to 
forfeiture.  The easiest way for the slaves of rebels to be seized and become emancipated was to 
have them cross Union lines.  Section 9 of the Second Confiscation Act makes clear that slaves 
of rebels who come physically under United States military control are free.  Section 11 of the 
Second Confiscation Act authorized President Lincoln to use persons of African descent 
however necessary to suppress the rebellion.  Consequently, the Emancipation Proclamation 
notes that newly freed slaves will be welcomed into the armed services.  Given the congressional 
directives, the proclamation can be deemed to be an attempt to drive human property already 
subject to forfeiture toward Union lines as a way to add men who can help the Union to suppress 
the rebellion.  Though there is reason to believe that that was not President Lincoln’s intent, 
President Lincoln would appear to have been clearly authorized under his “take care” authority 
to issue the Emancipation Proclamation for that purpose.  The application of the Emancipation 
Proclamation to the slaves of disloyal persons appears constitutional based on a simple and 
straightforward use of the President’s “take care” authority.   
How the Emancipation Proclamation applies to slaves who are held by loyal masters, but who 
escape or end up behind Union lines is trickier to address.  The Second Confiscation Act does 
not address how to treat the slaves of loyalists who end up behind Union lines, though it suggests 
that under certain circumstances the slaves of loyalists who cross borders and are found in non-
seceding states can be sent back to their loyalist owners.  The issue is difficult to analyze because 
slaves of loyalist owners who cross Union lines cannot be sent back to their loyalist masters by 
the military, per Congress’ “Law Enacting an Additional Article of War” (signed March 13, 
1862) and the Second Confiscation Act.  Again, it is important that the Second Confiscation Act 
allows President Lincoln to use freed or fugitive slaves to suppress the rebellion, and that the 
Emancipation Proclamation invites freed slaves to join the armed forces.   
The legislation enacted before the Emancipation Proclamation was issued complicated a 
practical problem for military commanders in the field.  Since the beginning of the war, military 
commanders had to address fugitive slaves who crossed Union lines.  After the Confiscation 
Acts were passed, some of the fugitive slaves were free because they had been used in support of 
the rebellion or had masters who were rebels.  Conversely, other slaves arguably were not free 
because their masters had remained loyal to the Union.  The commanders in the field had no way 
of knowing who was free and who was not.  Indeed, many commanders may not have cared who 
was technically free and who was not given that the commanders could not return fugitive slaves 
to their masters.  In addition, the fugitive slaves – free or not – could be used to do tasks that 
regular soldiers would have had to do otherwise.  After the Second Confiscation Act, the fugitive 
slaves who were sufficiently fit could be used for any military purpose.  Taken together, the 
various enactments suggest that commanders were authorized to use and should use whichever 
people of African descent arrived behind Union lines or in Union encampments however 
possible.   
Given the problem of fugitive slaves reaching Union lines that had existed since the beginning of 
the war, the Emancipation Proclamation could be read to recognize that slaves of loyalists almost 
certainly would continue to reach Union lines, would be put to work for the Union cause and 
almost certainly would not be re-enslaved after the war.  Congress’ arc toward emancipation 
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makes it difficult to imagine that slaves who served as Union soldiers would be returned to their 
loyalist masters after defending the Union cause in the war.  Indeed, President Lincoln’s mention 
in the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation of future attempts to suggest compensation for 
those loyalists who lost property in the war could be relevant.  It suggests a recognition that 
loyalists might be compensated for slaves lost or possibly commandeered during the war, but 
that those slaves would not be returned.  The Emancipation Proclamation’s grant of freedom to 
slaves of loyalists who might escape to Union lines could be viewed as an implied exercise of the 
president’s duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.  The proclamation may be 
justified as a preemptive way to deal with a problem that federal law helped create, but did not 
solve: fugitive slaves of loyalists behind Union lines who commanders can use for military 
purposes and who cannot be returned to loyalist owners.   
This construction of the president’s “take care” power would suggest that the president must 
attempt to faithfully execute all of the laws, as best as possible.  That is, when faced with a tangle 
of laws that creates a practical nightmare, the president may be allowed to choose a path that best 
addresses the practical problems that the legislation will almost certainly create.  The power to 
choose the best path would be implied by the more general duty to take care to faithfully execute 
all of the laws.  The Emancipation Proclamation’s preemptive freeing of the slaves of both 
loyalists and rebels appears to go beyond the legislation congress had passed before the 
Emancipation Proclamation was issued.  However, if the proclamation can be justified as a way 
to help address the practical problem of contraband fugitive slaves that commanders in the field 
had seen and likely would continue to see because of legislation that tilted toward encouraging 
fugitive slaves to find refuge behind Union lines and that tilted toward emancipation for former 
slaves who served in the U.S. armed forces, the proclamation could be well within the 
executive’s “take care” authority.        
The last group of slaves ostensibly freed by the Emancipation Proclamation – slaves who were 
owned by loyalists and who would never escape to Union lines – is the most difficult group to 
emancipate constitutionally under an interpretation of the president’s “take care” authority.  Even 
an expansive reading of any particular piece of legislation that Congress had passed before the 
Emancipation Proclamation was issued would not appear to suggest that the property of loyalists 
was subject to forfeiture.  In addition, the emancipation of such slaves does not readily appear to 
resolve a problem created or exacerbated by legislation.  A standard reading of the president’s 
“take care” authority that provided the president the implied power to go beyond the text of an 
enactment to do what was necessary to effectuate the purposes of a statute’s text might not cover 
the group of slaves at issue, as the law in place when the Emancipation Proclamation was issued 
appeared to protect the property of loyalists living behind Confederate lines.  However, a reading 
of the “take care” authority that allows the president to execute policy based on a broader vision 
of the sweep of legislation that has Congress has passed on a general topic might allow the 
Emancipation Proclamation to cover the group of slaves at issue.   
The mass of legislation that Congress had passed regarding slaves, slavery and the prosecution of 
the war provided President Lincoln with significant latitude and authority to confiscate and seize 
rebel property, to emancipate slaves, to use former slaves in the armed forces and to be 
aggressive in suppressing the rebellion.  If the president’s “take care” authority is aimed at the 
general arc of legislation rather than at a particular piece of legislation, the executive authority 
might cover the remaining group of slaves affected by the Emancipation Proclamation.  Of 
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course, such a vision of the “take care” clause might seem sensible in the context of 
emancipating slaves during the Civil War, but might not be so sensible in other contexts.  
How broadly the “take care” clause should be read depends on how broadly the nation’s chief 
executive’s job is conceived to be.  If the president’s job is to execute legislative enactments, the 
take care clause can be viewed either narrowly or expansively only relative to particular sections 
of legislation. Conversely, if the president’s job is to execute legislative policy reflected by the 
whole of legislation, the “take care” clause can be viewed very expansively.  There much more 
to say on the topic, but an initial exploration of the issue through the well-traveled terrain of the 
Emancipation Proclamation is useful, even after 150 years.    
 
Conclusion 
A reasonably liberal interpretation of the commander-in-chief power would likely deem the 
Emancipation Proclamation a legitimate exercise of constitutional executive authority.  Even 
when applied to the group of slaves least likely to have been covered by legislation in effect 
when the Emancipation Proclamation was passed – slaves of loyalists who had not escaped to 
Union lines – the Emancipation Proclamation could have been viewed, as President Lincoln 
suggested, as a fit war measure on a number of different bases.  However, justifying the 
Emancipation Proclamation without a resort to the commander-in-chief power is far more 
difficult.   
Nonetheless, some of the Emancipation Proclamation can be justified with reference to the 
executive’s standard “take care” power.  Most of the Emancipation Proclamation can be justified 
with reference to a sensibly broadened vision of the executive’s “take care” power that impliedly 
allows the executive to plot the best way to execute laws that, if applied strictly, would create 
serious problems for government officials charged with carrying out policy.  All of the 
Emancipation Proclamation could be justified if the president’s “take care” power were 
expanded to allow the president to execute broad legislative policy rather than just legislative 
enactments. Which vision is best is a question for another day. 
 
